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Appellant's Reply Brief,

response to the Respondent's
35,

made by Respondent in its Respondent's Brief filed on September 13, 2016.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS:

Appellant does not dispute the filing date of his application

for unemployment benefits, nor does he dispute the original IDOL determination. The IDOL
does not dispute that the original determination of timeliness of the filing of the appeal from this
first determination was proper, 1 so Appellant will not discuss this further.
As IDOL now concedes, the first determination was vacated and the appeal dismissed, so
that a new determination could be made with the correct figures (IDOL Respondent's Brief, p.
1). This point was a factor addressed in Appellant's original brief.
After the new Determination was made on August 12, 2015, Appellant appealed from
that determination and a second hearing was held on September 16, 2015. Judge Richmond
heard the case to its conclusion and ruled that Appellant had "wilfully misrepresented his weekly
earnings" and was thereby ineligible for unemployment benefits. The determination also ordered
reimbursement of the overpayment. Appellant filed his appeal to the Commission.
The Commission reviewed the record de nova, including Appellant's brief in support of
his appeal to the Commission. There was no other evidence requested or submitted.
IDOL and Appellant are not in dispute as to the procedural record or the course of
proceedings. They are in dispute as to the facts that were found, and the effect of the
"substantial, competent evidence" test.

1 Appellant

had moved and did not receive the first determination in a timely manner; this
was discussed in the first appeal hearing and resolved in Appellant's favor.
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PRESENTED AND ARGUMENT:

same:

IDOL POSITION
Christy's testimony about an
IDOL employee, "John,"
advising him to report his net
earnings is not supported by
notes of the IDOL.

APPELLANT POSITION

FURTHER COMMENTS

In Christy's July 28, 2015,
testimony, he testified that he
went to the Department's
"Water Tower Office" in
Meridian concerning the
reporting of his income
during the unemployment
period. He testified that he
was told to "report what he
got" as discussed with Ms.
Roop in the second hearing,
Tr 9.16.15, p. 15, L. 13-24.

The IDOL notes do not
discuss this topic, nor do they
have a place to do so. Please
consider the exhibits attached
to the Notice of Telephone
Hearing of 9/3/2015, which
are the written exhibits. The
"Notes" begin on Exhibit
page 27 of 85 and run
through page 39 of 85. There
is no question ever asked, nor
any place to make such a note
by the IDOL representative.
In fact, those are the
Claimant's weekly reports.

The mistake is twofold, and
the IDOL simply refuses to
recognize the distinction.
"Report what he got" could
mean EITHER "gross" OR
"net." The IDOL
representative and Mr.
Christy clearly could have
understood the term
differently.
"During his second appeal,
Christy asserted for the first
time that he has problems
with numbers and doesn't
read well."

The exhibits-the
department's own
records-show that Mr.
Christy is and was confused
by several things in the
instructions.
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Also look at the notes on p.
40 Of 85 for 12/19/14 and
1/2/15. A review of those
notes show that Appellant
was confused about what he
was to report and whether he
understood the questions
properly.
Christy should not be
penalized for bringing this up
on his "second" appeal. The
first appeal was dismissed
and never completed.
Moreover, his testimony at
the first appeal was never
completed.. Judge Richmond
terminated that hearing and
dismissed the appeal so that
Ms. Roop could review the
new information and

IDOL POSITION

APPELLANT POSITION

FURTHER COMMENTS

documentation and make a
new determination, from
which a NEW appeal would
be taken.
"The Commission did not
find Christy's explanation for
his enors to be credible."

In all candor, the
Commission, in its de nova
review, never made that
statement expressly or
impliedly. Rather, the
Commission's review
centered on the written
instructions and the internet
based system for the weekly
repo1t. The Commission
asserted that "the issue in this
case comes down to assessing
the probability that, given the
information available to
Claimant, he did not know
what IDOL was asking, and,
then, deliberately elected not
to seek clarification. Meyer,
99 Idaho at 762, 589 P .2d at
97."

The Commission asserted
that "the issue in this case
comes down to assessing the
probability that, given the
information available to
Claimant, he did not know
what IDOL was asking,
and, then, deliberately
elected not to seek
clarification. Meyer, 99
Idaho at 762, 589 P.2d at
97."

"The Commission observed
that Christy was apprised on
multiple occasions during the
unemployment benefits
application process that he
was to report his gross
earnings" specifically
including a Power Point
presentation.

The PowerPoint presentation
simply is not all there. This
is a substantial issue to
Appellant. There is a great
amount of emphasis in the
decisions of all concerned
about the slide show but a
great deal of it is missing.
And with a de novo review,
there is no place for
Appellant to object to
consideration of the
incompetent hearsay
evidence.

This "PowerPoint"
presentation starts on Exhibit
page 12 of 85 and continues
to page 14. Nowhere on this
PowerPoint presentation does
the phrase "gross earnings" or
any synonym therefore
appear at all. Rather, it was
asserted that there was a
drop-down menu to this
effect, but that was never
cured between the exhibits
from the first to second
appeal, or at any time
thereafter. The Commission,
apparently, relied on
evidence that was not
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IDOL POSITION

APPELLANT POSITION

FURTHER COMMENTS

anywhere

"Claimant also received a
booklet ... This booklet
includes a section describing
how earnings affect a
claimant's weekly benefits.
The provision included the
statement that a claimant
'must report all amounts
earned, even if gross earnings
are less than half the
claimant's weekly benefits
payment."

Again, this mentions 'gross
earnings' in an entirely
different context. The
booklet does not say that the
applicant is to report his
gross earnings at all; it makes
one comment about gross
earnings but does not say that
it is gross, rather than net,
earnings that are to be
reported.

"To illustrate how Christy's
claimed excuse failed to
explain the discrepancies for
most of the reporting weeks, .
. ." the IDOL sets forth yet
another table, similar to that
in the Commission's
Decision and Order.

The Commission's table is
used to support its findings
that the "excuse" would only
apply for January 3, January
24, February 7. Yet neither
the Respondent's Brief nor
the Commission's Decision
and Order explain the
breakpoint they used to
determine that the "excuse" is
or is not applicable. This is
not discretionary; this table is
as arbitrary as the
Commission's decision.

"The Commission, in what
arguably was a factual and
legal stretch, gave Christy the
benefit of the doubt with
regard to three reporting
weeks."

As stated in the prior topic,
why those three? Just as
valid an argument can be
made that the 'substantial,
competent evidence,' without
being arbitrary, would only
support finding against
Christy for 2/28, 3/14 and
3/21. Those dates are where
the variance would exceed
$40.
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the

The highlighted portions are
those that the Commission
allowed but it is impossible
to see what standard they
used. January 2, for example,
is 5 cents difference; the next
week is $4.56. January 23 is
25 cents and February 6 is 15
cents. February 20, though,
is only $4.36 difference and
January 16 $16.53. What is
the standard for this
"discretion?" There is NO
standard that can be deduced
from either table.

IDOL POSITION

APPELLANT POSITION

FURTHER COMMENTS

creates another
straw man argument when
he lambasts testimony
concerning a "pop-up" in the
slide presentation about
gross earnings that he would
have viewed, and the fact
that there was no
documentary evidence of
the actual slide or image of
the pop-up admitted to
support the testimony. What
Christy fails to mention,
though, are the other slides,
the booklet and the
confirmation page
that all were admitted
without objection, which all
apprised Christy of his duty
to report his gross wages -that is, his earnings before
deductions."

This is far from a 'straw
argument The phrase is
defined as "a weak or
imaginary argument or
opponent that is set up to be
easily defeated." Me1TiamWebster's Dictionary. That
phrase, however, is
misleading. The point is that
the "popup" was on the
claimant- employee's weekly
report-that online form
which Appellant filled out
every week as required. We
don't know what it said
because it does not exist in
this record. The significance
of that popup was that it was
relied on by the Department
in both of the appeals
hearings.

The failure to have that
popup in the record was
addressed in the first appeals
hearing of 7.28.15, p. 21, l.
14-24; p. 23, 1. 12-18. The
Department, in these
hearings, put great weight on
this popup as reminding
Appellant weekly that he was
to report gross earnings. Yet
it is conspicuously absent.
Moreover, that absence was
not co1Tected in the hearing
of 9.16.15, where it was
discussed at p. 22, 1. 12-25-p.
23, 1. 1-10. There was no
way to examine that popup,
or cross-examine based on its
wording, or even ask
Appellant about his
understanding of it because it
doesn't exist.

"Christy also has no answer
to the reasoning of
Commission's decision and,
in particular, the questions it
raised concerning his
credibility, other than,
perhaps, the weak and
essentially unsubstantiated
claim that he suffers from
mental infirmities relating to
his math skills and English
comprehension."

The Commission's de novo
review was supposedly based
on the existing record. If it
had these so-called
"questions," then why did the
Commission not perform its
obligations under its own
Rules of requesting further
evidence or testimony on this
point?

The Commission clearly
went into this appeal with the
predilection to make sure that
the Appellant would not
prevail. This is discussed
more fully in the next topic
below.

One major issue, not addressed by the IDOL, is the violation by the Commission of its
own procedural regulations and the statutory framework governing "de novo" review of the
record.
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Commission,
Idaho
='-"-"-'

its Decision

Super Grade v. Idaho Dept Of Commerce and

144 Idaho 386 (2007) for its authority to conduct a de nova review. However, these

authorities do not quite go as far as the Commission believes.
Idaho Code §72-1368(7) reads as follows (emphasis added):
(7) The commission shall decide all claims for review filed by any interested party in
accordance with its own rules of procedure not in conflict herewith. The record before the
commission shall consist of the record of proceedings before the appeals examiner, unless
it appears to the commission that the interests of justice require that the interested parties
be pe1mitted to present additional evidence. In that event, the commission may, in its sole
discretion, conduct a hearing or may remand the matter back to the appeals examiner for
an additional hearing and decision. On the basis of the record of proceedings before the
appeals examiner as well as additional evidence, if allowed, the commission shall affirm,
reverse, modify, set aside or revise the decision of the appeals examiner or may refer the
matter back to the appeals examiner for further proceedings.
In the Brief of Appellant dated 10.26.15 to the Commission from the decision of the Examiner,
the Appellant cited the Commission's own Rules of Appellate Practice and Procedure (RAPP),
pursuant to the above statute. As stated, there was no request for a further evidentiary hearing
because the briefs were to "be based upon the evidence as established in the evidentiary record.
Any inclusion of, or comment on, evidence not contained in the record as admitted by the
Appeals Examiner will not be considered by the Commission." Yet the Commission did exactly
that.
Amazingly, at least to Appellant, the term "de novo" is not contained anywhere in the
RAPP. Rather, the rules state specifically that the review would be based on the existing record
unless the Commission, in its discretion, either allowed for a new hearing, a limited hearing on
some specific points or issues, or remanded to the examiner. This is in the 'discretion' of the
Commission.

Page 6 of

10

presentation

additional evidence.

was no such request here, and no notice that it was doing anything else than an appellate review
of the existing record. The Commission did grant Appellant the right to file a brief, which
Appellant did.
This Court has had recent occasion to construe 'abuse of discretion' when applied to the
Commission. See Boyd-Davis v. Macomber Law, 342 P.3d 661 (Idaho, 2015), holding that there
is a "three-part test is used when reviewing whether the Commission abused its discretion.
Flowers v. Shenango Screenprinting, Inc., 150 Idaho 295,297,246 P.3d 668,670 (2010). This
Court determines: " (1) whether the Commission co1Tectly perceived the issue as one of
discretion, (2) whether it acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it, and (3) whether it reached its
decision by an exercise of reason." Id. ( quoting Super Grade, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of Commerce &
Labor, 144 Idaho 386, 390, 162 P.3d 765, 769 (2007)).
Rather than the Super Grade decision, however, which was not a case involving
unemployment compensation, Appellant request this Court compare two similar decisions
involving unemployment benefits with disparate results and the teachings therefrom: Small v.
Jacklin Seed Co., 109 Idaho 541, and Jensen v. Siemsen, 118 Idaho 1. Both were unemployment
cases where the applicant resigned due to alleged sexual harassment. Small resulted in a remand
to the Commission, while Jensen was affirmed. The reasons for the distinction were outlined in
the Jensen decision, where this Court stated that "In Small v. Jacklin Seed, 109 Idaho 541, 709
P.2d 114 (1985), the underlying claim was sexual harassment, however the sole issue presented
was whether the findings of the Industrial Commission were supported by substantial evidence.
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at
v.t\.Luv,w

that the question

were not contained

the record.

The Court then

Jensen was the applicable standard, and the Court held that the

definition of "sexual harassment" was not a term of which Idaho had ever defined; therefore, in
looking at the "various guidelines, standards and cases defining sexual harassment," the Court
could not conclude that the Commission e1Ted as a matter of law in its findings.
In this case, however, the Commission did not properly exercise its discretion. It gave
Appellant credit for weeks and failed to do so for other weeks based on what appears to be no
standards whatever. It did not request, as it had discretion to do, additional evidence on the
Appellant's language and mathematical difficulties. Rather, they "wilfully" disregarded the
uncontradicted testimony because it was not presented at the first hearing-even though that
hearing was terminated by the Hearing Officer.
The uncontradicted evidence, which was simply disparaged by the Commission due to
the timing of the testimony, is that Appellant has dyslexia in numbers and letters (Tr., 9.16.15, p.
34, 1. 21-25). He has reading difficulties and always has (p. 35, L. 1-12). And he is not a native
English user; rather, Tagalog (native Filipino) is his native language (p. 35, 1. 19-25). The
Commission did not have the discretion to ignore that testimony under Idaho law; if they had
questions or wanted to examine him over that point, then their discretion should have called for a
hearing on that point as required by Idaho Code §72-1368(7).

ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL
The IDOL requests that attorneys' fees and costs be awarded to the Department. The
IDOL states that attorneys' fees on appeal are all that are awardable. At this juncture, Appellant
has not requested attorneys' fees for the hearings before the Appeals Examiner or the
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in the

was not
matters.

it

not

said prior to this appeal

the State acted "without a

reasonable basis in fact or law." This was a disputed matter on both sides.
Rather, the IDOL claims that this appeal "does nothing more than ask this Court to
reweigh the evidence." That position ignores the issues presented. Appellant asserts that the
Commission violated several well-defined precepts of law, its own rules in the RAPP, and failed
to properly exercise its discretion in various manners discussed above. This appeal is not
without a reasonable basis in fact or law; rather, the Commission's ruling is itself clearly
eIToneous and cannot stand. Attorneys' fees for this appeal are appropriate.
Dated this 141h day of October, 2016.
LAW OFFICE OF D. BLAIR CLARK, PC
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Deputy Attorneys General
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